Based upon current game theory and previously established biological criteria we attempted to empirically demonstrate the existence of a species that displays hawk-like levels of aggression. To do this we studied aggression in the Hawaiian red lobster, Enoplometopus occidentalis. Twelve mated pairs of lobsters were tested, using four pairs per trial. Results suggest that these lobsters display hawk-like aggression. While intersexual and intrasexual encounters were equally likely to occur, aggression was restricted to intrasexual encounters with males and females displaying the same high levels of aggression. Assessment of encounters based upon size, home tank, and damage inflicted indicated that damage inflicted was the only reliable indicator of winning, and 83.3% of all lobsters suffered damage by the end of the experiment. Even after damage was inflicted and individuals retreated, 'winners' continued to pursue, indicating a lack of submissive behaviours. The behavioural interactions between unmated males and females indicated that this species does not display mate choice. Finally, the results indicate that cheliped-to-cheliped contact is important, if not obligate, for sexual recognition.
Introduction
CUSHING & REESE Despite the fact that many animals possess impressive potential offensive weapons, such as claws, antlers, teeth, etc., the vast majority of intraspecific aggressive encounters are resolved with little or no physical damage being inflicted. It has been argued that encounters do not escalate to the point of physical damage because of the cost associated with escalation. Instead disputes are settled based upon differences in resource holding potential, RHP, (Parker, 1974) of the participants or by a game theoretic where costs and benefits are 'weighed' (Maynard-Smith & Price, 1973) . A difference in RHP may be represented by a difference in experience, knowledge of the value of a resource, or by an asymmetry, such as size or physical condition. In the classic hawk/dove game where hawks escalate and doves never escalate the hawk strategy is an ESS if the value of winning is greater than the cost of losing, while a dove can only exist as part of a mixed-ESS. Conflicts resulting in damage are therefore only likely to occur when the asymmetry between RHP is small (Parker, 1974) , the resource is extremely valuable, or when an individual is aware that it is involved in its last encounter or chance to reproduce which may lead to fatal fighting (Enquist & Leimar, 1990) . Given that potential combatants often have different RHPs and the fact that there may be a high cost to escalating there may only be a few conditions under which a hawk-like species might evolve. Two recent models, which relax some of the assumptions of the original model, have suggested situations under which increased escalation may occur. Colegrave (1994) suggested that being in a 'closed' system, where individuals lack the choice to leave an area, may increase direct competition forcing individuals into higher levels of aggression. Cushing (1995) presented a game theory model in which the hawk strategy can be an ESS even if cost is greater than value. This model assumes that a hawk can damage a dove, which adds a cost to the dove when it encounters a hawk. The probability of being damaged now influences the likelihood of playing hawk and if the probability of a hawk damaging a dove is greater than 50% then hawk becomes an ESS regardless of cost and benefit.
Colegrave's closed system model is restricted to situations where resources occur in patches and the probability of getting to another patch is small, while Cushing (1995) suggested that escalation could occur in species requiring obligate physical contact for sexual recognition which
